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Evolutionary dynamics of two communities under
environmental feedback
Yu Kawano, Member, Lulu Gong, Student Member, Brian D. O. Anderson, Life Fellow, and
Ming Cao, Senior Member
Abstract—In this paper, we study the evolutionary dynamics of
two different types of communities in an evolving environment.
We model the dynamics using an evolutionary differential game
consisting of two sub-games: 1) a game between two different
communities and 2) a game between communities and the
environment. Our interest is to clarify when the two communities
and environment can coexist dynamically under the feedback
from the changing environment. Mathematically speaking, we
show that for specific game payoffs, the corresponding three-
dimensional replicator dynamics induced by the evolutionary
game have an infinite number of periodic orbits.
Index Terms—Biological systems, game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERACTIONS among communities and their surround-ing environments have been studied from various aspects,
see e.g., [1], [2] for ecosystems and [3], [4] for epidemic
processes. Especially in evolutionary game theory, interactions
among two communities (without environments), e.g. two
competing species [5] or males and females [6], have been
intensively studied in order to understand the mechanisms for
their evolution. Such games with two types of players [7] have
been generalized to games within a networked population [8]
or interacting communities [9]. More importantly, the results
in [8], [9] with the help of the classical tools from evolutionary
game theory [10], [11] have built up extended replicator
dynamics models [11], [12].
In contrast to the development of analysis of interacting
communities, the interactions between communities and their
environments have not been well studied in the evolutionary
game framework even though for a dynamic game evolving
over a long period, the surrounding environment can dynami-
cally change and affect the strategies of each community. For
instance, if two competing species prey on the same species,
their strategy can vary depending on the amount of the prey,
since if the species of prey were to die out, this would lead to
extinction of either or both species of predators. Recently, to
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study interaction between the environment and a single com-
munity, the paper [13] introduced the concept of environmental
feedback and accordingly modified the replicator dynamics
into the so-called replicator dynamics with feedback-evolving
games. Based on this model, dynamical coexistence or non-
coexistence of an environment and the single community has
been studied.
By extending the concept of an environment, in this paper,
we clarify under what conditions two competing communities
and a surrounding environment can all coexist dynamically,
which is a first but necessary step toward analyzing interaction
among multiple communities and environments. Such condi-
tions can be easily understood in pedagogical examples: In the
two competing predators and a single prey example, if both
species of predators stop preying on the prey when its amount
becomes small, then the prey does not die out, and eventually
its amount increases. After sufficient increase, the predators
start to prey again. Our goal is then to mathematically prove
that for specific payoffs, the modified replicator dynamics
of two communities with feedback-evolving games have an
infinite number of periodic orbits. Note that studying oscil-
lating coexistence is mathematically more challenging than
studying non-coexistence because non-coexistence analysis
usually reduces to stability analysis of an equilibrium point,
and then linearization very often works for such a problem.
If the dimension of a system is higher than two, as is the
system we study, which has dimension 3, analysis of periodic
orbits (including establishing their existence) is technically
more involved, since the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem [14] is
not directly applicable. Nevertheless, perhaps surprisingly, the
evolutionary game considered in this paper can be decomposed
into two sub-games: 1) a game between two-different commu-
nities which turns out to be very straightforward to analyze,
and 2) a game between the communities and environment. The
periodic behavior arises in the latter game and to demonstrate
this, our main idea is to somehow integrate the two commu-
nities into a single community. Then, the problem reduces to
an evolutionary game with the integrated single community
and environment, and the obtained new dynamics, which are
second order, can be viewed as replicator dynamics of the
reduced game. For the reduced replicator dynamics, one can
apply the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem.
Besides the contribution of providing a more comprehen-
sive model for evolutionary dynamics for two communities
under environmental feedback, there are also several notable
technical contributions compared to the existing literature.
First, our replicator dynamics are parameter-varying systems,
and we provide detailed analysis and a formal proof for the
existence of an infinite number of periodic orbits. Furthermore,
we provide a new interpretation of environmental feedback in
terms of a game and then establish the connection between
environmental feedback and an evolutionary game on a net-
worked population (or interacting communities). We clarify
that in fact the existing model and ours are specific games on a
networked population, i.e., replicator dynamics with feedback-
evolving games are equivalent to replicator dynamics on a
networked population. Note however that the work in [8],
[9] on networked population focuses on analysis of the Nash
equilibria by restricting payoff matrix structures to different
structures from ours; for this reason, results in these papers
cannot be applied to our problem.
We emphasize that our evolutionary game models with
environmental feedback can be interpreted using predator-prey
interactions. In fact, the standard predator-prey dynamics are
typically represented by the Lotka-Volterra equation, which is
equivalent to replicator dynamics of a single-community with-
out an environment [15]. Therefore, our modified replicator
dynamics can also be viewed as an extension of the Lotka-
Volterra equation to represent interaction among two different
species of predators and a single species of prey.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces two evolutionary games: 1) a game between
two different communities and 2) a game between the com-
munities and the environment. Then, the corresponding three-
dimensional replicator dynamics are presented. In Section III,
the payoff matrix structures for coexistence of two commu-
nities and the environment are given. Then, for these payoff
matrix structures, it is shown that the replicator dynamics have
an infinite number of periodic orbits. Section IV considers a
special case when one community fixes its strategy irrespec-
tive of the state of the environment, and Section V makes
concluding remarks.
II. EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF TWO COMMUNITIES
UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL FEEDBACK
A. Games between Two Different Types of Community
Consider an evolutionary game with two different types of
community i = I, II . Here, each community consists of two
types of populations, i1 and i2, where each community does
not have a game within the community. Let si,i1 and si,i2 be
the proportions (frequencies) of cooperators and defectors in
community i, respectively. Then, [si,i1 , si,i2 ] is the vector of
distribution in community i, which describes the state of the
community. Without loss of generality, assume each member
of the community is either a cooperator or defector, namely
si,i1 + si,i2 = 1, and define xi := si,i1 .
Suppose that the payoffs (fitness) of every population ij
linearly depends on both [sI,I1 , sI,I2 ] = [xI , 1 − xI ] and
[sII,II1 , sII,II2 ] = [xII , 1 − xII ]. Let AI = (aIIj ,IIk) and AII =
(aIIIj ,IIk), j, k = 1, 2 be the two differing payoff matrices of
communities I and II , respectively, e.g., population Ij receives
a payoff aIIj ,IIk when it interacts with population IIk. Since
there is no game within each community, there is no interaction
between i1 and i2, i = I, II . In this situation, the expected
payoffs of populations Ij and IIk are respectively given by
UI(Ij , xII) = a
I
Ij ,II1xII + a
I
Ij ,II2(1− xII),







Then, the average expected payoffs of communities I and II
are respectively given by
U¯i(x) = xiUi(i1, xj) + (1− xi)Ui(i2, xj), i ̸= j. (2)
B. Environmental Feedback
In this subsection, we extend the concept of environmental
feedback [13] to the two-community scenario and investigate
under what conditions two different types of communities and
the environment coexist dynamically. Accordingly, payoffs of
communities are modified as functions of the environment,
where by abuse of notation, the same symbols are used to
describe payoff functions depending on the environment. Note
that, differently from [13], we introduce environmental dy-
namics from the perspective of a game with communities and
the environment. Building on this, we establish the connection
between environmental feedback and a game on an interacting
communities [8], [9].
Consider a single environment consisting of two types of
populations, III1 and III2, and there is no game within the
environment. Let rj , j = 1, 2 be the proportion of population j
of environment, and then r1 + r2 = 1. Define n := r1,
and consequently r2 = 1 − n. Then, the modified payoff
matrices are defined as functions of n, AI(n) = (aIIj ,IIk(n))
and AII(n) = (aIIIj ,IIk(n)).
Suppose that the payoffs of populations III1 and III2
linearly depend on the populations of communities, si1 = xi
and si2 = 1 − xi, i = I, II . Let Bi = (bj,ik), i = I, II ,
j, k = 1, 2 be the payoff matrices of environment III when it
interacts with community i, i.e., population IIIj receives bj,ik
when it interacts with population ik. Then, the expected payoff
of population IIIj is
V (IIIj , x) =
II∑
i=I
(bj,i1xi + bj,i2(1− xi)) , (3)
and the average expected payoff of the environment is
V¯ (x, n) = nV (III1, x) + (1− n)V (III2, x). (4)
In summary, we obtain modified replicator dynamics with
environmental feedback: εx˙I = xI(UI(I1, xII , n)− U¯I(x, n)),εx˙II = xII(UII(II1, xI , n)− U¯II(x, n)),
n˙ = n(V (III1, x)− V¯ (x, n)).
(5)
where from the modified versions of (1) and (2),











, i ̸= j
and from (3) and (4),





(b1,i1 − b2,i1)xi + (b1,i2 − b2,i2)(1− xi)
)
.
In the first and second equations of (5), ε > 0 represents
the difference of time-scales between communities and en-
vironment. The last equation describes the dynamics of the
environment. Notice that the system (5) is specific replica-
tor dynamics for a networked population [8] or interacting
communities [9], where one component, environment, has a
different type of payoff from the others. This kind of situation
has not been studied in [8], [9]. Finally, the difference from
a situation describing replicator dynamics for six populations
in one community is that si,i1 + si,i2 = 1, i = I, II and
r1 + r2 = 1 hold instead of
∑2
j=1 sI,Ij + sII,IIj + rj = 1.
III. COEXISTENCE OF TWO DIFFERENT TYPES OF
COMMUNITIES AND ENVIRONMENT
In this section, for a specific choice of payoff matrices, we
show that the modified replicator dynamics (5) have an infinite
number of periodic orbits.
A. Studied Replicator Dynamics
In a similar manner with the single community case [13],













where ai > ci and bi > di, i = I, II . Each matrix has an
embedded symmetry to ensure that mutual cooperation is a
Nash equilibrium when n = 1 and mutual defection is a Nash
equilibrium when n = 0 [13].
For the environment, we choose payoff matrices so that if
two communities are relatively cooperative (resp. defective),
then environment tends to defective (resp. cooperative), i.e.,
snowdrift types of payoff, b1,i1 < b2,i1 and b1,i2 > b2,i2 ,
i = I, II .
In summary, we use the following model:
Σ :

εx˙I = −σIxI(1− xI)(1 + ∆IxII)(1− 2n),
εx˙II = −σIIxII(1− xII)(1 + ∆IIxI)(1− 2n),
n˙ = −n(1− n)∑IIi=I((θi + λi)xi − λi), (7)
where σi := bi− di > 0, ∆i := (ai− ci)/(bi− di)− 1 > −1,
θi := b2,i1 − b1,i1 > 0, and λi := b1,i2 − b2,i2 > 0, i =
I, II . For the dynamics (7), the boundary of the cube [0, 1]3
is positively invariant. Therefore, the cube itself is positively
invariant. Our interest is dynamics in this cube. To avoid the
confusion with a point in R2, denote open and closed intervals
by I(a,b) := (a, b) and I[a,b] := [a, b] for a < b, respectively,
e.g. I3[0,1] = [0, 1]
3.
The model Σ has the following properties.
(a) If n > 1/2 (n < 1/2) then x˙i > 0 (< 0), i = I, II;
(b) if
∑II
i=I(θi + λi)xi − λi > 0 (< 0) then n˙ < 0 (> 0).
Therefore, one might reasonably expect that there are limiting
orbits in which none of xI , xII or n converges to zero (we
note also that there is an equilibrium point for the equations




























Fig. 1. Trajectories of system Σ, where ε = 0.1, σI = 1, σII = 3,
∆I = −1/2, ∆II = 2, λ1 = λ2 = 1 and θ1 = θ2 = 2. (Left) Time series
of the state (xI , xII , n). (Right) Four trajectories of xI -xII -n system.
and n = 1/2, the stability of which needs closer examination).
In the predator-prey example of the Introduction, none of two
competing predators and single prey dies out. Figures 1 shows
some trajectories of system Σ. For different choices of payoff
matrices, one might observe periodic behaviors However, even
in our intuitively reasonable problem setting, it is a mathemati-
cally nontrivial fact that these trajectories are actually periodic
orbits. The difference of behaviors between xI and xII actually
corresponds to the game between two communities. Studying
this difference is another goal of the research.
Our goal is to prove that the system Σ has an infinite
number of periodic orbits. The periodic behavior occurs due
to the interaction between communities and the environment.
To focus on this interaction, we examine how to integrate two
communities into a single community, i.e., reduce the first two
equations of the system Σ into a single equation. Then, we
study the reduced order two-dimensional system.
B. Integration of Two Communities
The main idea of our analysis is applying the change of
variables a = ϕII(xII)− ϕI(xI), where
ϕi(xi) = (ln(xi)− (1 + ∆j) ln(1− xi))/σi, j ̸= i. (8)
This ϕi(xi) exists and is analytic on I(0,1), and its range is






is positive on I(0,1), i.e., ϕi is strictly increasing on I(0,1).
Thus, ϕi has the (global) inverse function ϕ−1i : R → I(0,1),
which is analytic on R1.
Now, we apply globally real-analytic diffeomorphism ψ :
I3(0,1) ∋ (xI , xII , n) 7→ (z, n, a) ∈ I2(0,1) × R, where
ψ(xI , xII , n) =
[
xI n ϕII(xII)− ϕI(xI)
]T
. (10)
From the first two equations of (7) and (9), the system Σ in
the (z, n, a)-coordinates is
Σa :
{
εz˙ = −σIz(1− z)(1 + ∆Iϕ−1II (a+ ϕI(z)))(1− 2n),
n˙ = −n(1− n)f(z),
a˙ = 0,
f(z) := (θI + λI)z + (θII + λII)ϕ
−1
II (a+ ϕI(z))
− (λI + λII).
1This conclusion depends critically on the assumption of use of prisoner’s
dilemma payoff matrices Ai,j(n), i.e., σi > 0 and ∆i < −1, i = I, II .
Since a(t) = a(0) for any t ≥ 0, the first two subsystems
of Σ in the new coordinates denoted by Σa constitute a two-
dimensional system with a constant parameter a ∈ R. The
new variable z can be viewed as the integrated proportion of
communities I and II . Therefore, the system Σa describes
the interaction between the integrated community and envi-
ronment. In the following subsections, we analyze this two-
dimensional system Σa with a constant parameter, and then
go back to the original coordinates.
Although the range of ψ in (10) does not contain I2[0,1]×R,
the system Σa itself is defined on I2[0,1] at each fixed a ∈ R.
Actually, at each a ∈ R, we have ϕ−1II (a + ϕI(0)) = 0 and
ϕ−1II (a + ϕI(1)) = 1, with ϕ
−1
II (a + ϕI(z)) ∈ I(0,1) for z ∈
I(0,1). Then one sees easily that I2[0,1] is a positively invariant
set of the system Σa for any a ∈ R.
To study orbits and their periodicity, one needs to take
several steps. We first compute equilibria. Then, we construct
an energy function whose time derivative along the trajectory
of the system Σa is identically zero, which is effectively a
constant of motion. Finally we show that almost each level
set corresponds to a periodic orbit, based on the Poincare´-
Bendixson theorem [14].
C. Equilibrium Points
We compute the equilibria of the system Σa.
First, at each a ∈ R, each corner in {0, 1}2 =
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} is an equilibrium. By checking
the system Σa, there is a heteroclinic cycle [14]
(0, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 1) → (1, 0) → (0, 0) on the
boundary I2[0,1] \ I2(0,1). Also, at each corner, one can check
that the Jacobian matrix has one positive and one negative
real eigenvalue. This implies that there is no trajectory
converging to a corner without touching the boundary
I2[0,1] \ (I2(0,1) ∪ {0, 1}2). Otherwise, the dimension of
the unstable manifold around each corner would be two,
contradicting the eigenvalue sign property.
Next, we consider the interior I2(0,1). In the right hand side
of the first equation for z˙, the range of ϕ−1II is I(0,1) and
∆I > −1. Thus, z˙ = 0 if and only if n = 1/2. When n = 1/2,
n˙ = 0 if and only if f(z) = 0. We now show that just one
such possibility exists:
Proposition 3.1: For any a ∈ R, f(z) = 0 has a unique
solution z¯a in I(0,1).
Proof: First, we show that f(z) is strictly increasing on
I(0,1). Since θi + λi > 0, i = I, II , it suffices to show that
ϕ−1II (a+ϕI(z)) is strictly increasing. As mentioned after (9),
ϕi(z), i = I, II are strictly increasing, and so are their inverses
ϕ−1i , as is the composition ϕ
−1
II (a+ ϕI(z)).
Next, we show that f(z) = 0 has a solution in I(0,1). For
any a ∈ R, the ranges of both z and ϕ−1II (a+ϕI(z)) are I(0,1),
and consequently the range of f(z) is I(−λI−λII ,θI+θII) that
contains 0. Finally, we consider the uniqueness. In the original
coordinates, f(z) = 0 is
(θI + λI)xI + (θII + λII)xII − (λI + λII) = 0.
For any fixed xII , xI is a unique solution, which implies that
for any a ∈ R, f(z) = 0 has a unique solution.
It is worth mentioning that the two eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix at (z¯a, 1/2) lie on the imaginary axis, and
thus the Hartman-Grobman theorem [14] is not applicable to
identify the stability of Σa. In fact, as shown in Section III-E,
(z¯a, 1/2) is neutrally stable, a fact which follows from the
existence of an infinite number of periodic orbits.
D. Constant of Motion
In this subsection, we construct a constant of motion for the
system Σa and then show that it takes a unique maximum at
(z¯a, 1/2), a fact to be used for analysis of its level sets.
A constant of motion is obtained as follows.
Theorem 3.2: Define the following scalar valued func-
tion Ha on I2(0,1):
Ha(z, n) := Hz,a(z) +Hn(n), (11)




hz,a(y)dy, ∀z ∈ I(0,1), (13)
hz,a(y) :=
−f(y)
y(1− y)(1 + ∆Iϕ−1II (a+ ϕI(y)))
.
Then, Ha is analytic on I2(0,1), and its time derivative along
the trajectory of system Σa is identical to zero on I2(0,1)
2.
Remark 3.3: From the system equation of Σa, we have
−hz,a(z)dz = (σI(1 − 2n)/εn(1 − n))dn. By performing
the integrations, one can construct the constant of motion Ha.
In [13], a constant of motion for two-dimensional replicator
dynamics are constructed in a similar way, but without analysis
on a maximum point or level sets as is done in this paper.
Proof: First, we show that Ha is analytic. Since Hn is
analytic on I(0,1), we focus on Hz,a. For any fixed a ∈ R,
ϕ−1II (a + ϕI(·)) is analytic on I(0,1), and its range is I(0,1).
From ∆I > −1, the denominator of hz,a is positive on I(0,1),
and thus hz,a is defined and analytic on I(0,1). Therefore, hz,a
is integrable on any compact interval in I(0,1), i.e., its primitive
function Hz,a exists on I(0,1). Since hz,a is analytic on the
simply connected interval I(0,1), Hz,a is analytic on I(0,1).
Finally, one can confirm dHa(z, n)/dt = 0.
Next, we investigate the existence of a maximum point.
Lemma 3.4: The function Ha(z, n) in (11) takes a unique
maximum value over I2(0,1), denoted by ca ∈ R, at (z¯a, 1/2).
Proof: It can be confirmed that Hn(n) takes a unique
maximum at n = 1/2. Then, we show that Hz,a(z) takes a
unique maximum at z¯a. The derivative of Hz,a(z) with respect
to z is hz,a(z). According to the proof of Theorem 3.2, the
denominator of hz,a(z) is positive for any z ∈ I(0,1). Since
z = z¯a is a unique solution to f(z) = 0, ∂Hz,a(z)/∂z =
hz,a(z) = 0 if and only if z = z¯a. That is, z¯a is a unique
stationary point of Hz,a(z).
To demonstrate the stationary point is a maximum, it







z(1− z)(1 + ∆Iϕ−1II (a+ ϕI(z)))
)
2Existence of Ha requires the denominator of hz,a to be nonzero, and the
prisoner’s dilemma property helps assure this.
is negative at z¯a. Using the usual derivative formula for a




z(1− z)(1 + ∆Iϕ−1II (a+ ϕI(z)))
+ f(z)
d(z(1− z)(1 + ∆Iϕ−1II (a+ ϕI(z))))
dz
.
Because f(z¯a) = 0, the second term vanishes at z¯a. Next, in
the first term, the proof of Proposition 3.1 implies df(z)/dz
is positive on I(0,1), and z(1 − z)(1 + ∆ϕ−1II (a + ϕI(z))) is
positive on I(0,1). Thus, the Hessian is negative at z¯a.
E. Level Sets and Closed Orbits
In this subsection, we first show that each level set of the
constant of motion is a periodic orbit except for the unique
maximum. Then, we conclude the property of the original
three dimensional system.
First, we analyze the level sets.
Lemma 3.5: Let Ba be the range of Ha in (11), i.e., Ba :=
Ha(I
2
(0,1)) ⊂ R. For any b ∈ Ba, define
Ωa,b := {(z, n) ∈ I2(0,1) : Ha(z, n) = b}. (14)
Then, each Ωa,b is a positively invariant set of the system Σa.
Moreover, denote L+a,b as the set of positive limit points of
its trajectories starting from Ωa,b. Then, L+a,b is a non-empty,
compact, and positively invariant subset of Ωa,b.
Proof: First, we show positive invariance of Ωa,b ⊂
I2(0,1), where we recall that I
2
[0,1] is positively invariant as
mentioned in Section III-B. Note that Ha is not finite on
I2[0,1] \ (I2(0,1)∪{0, 1}2). Thus, any trajectory starting from the
interior I2(0,1) does not converge into I
2
[0,1] \ (I2(0,1) ∪{0, 1}2).
Then, the discussion of the trajectories near each corner
{0, 1}2 in Section III-C allows the conclusion that the interior
I2(0,1) is positively invariant.
Let (z(t), n(t)) be the solution to the system Σa starting
from (z(0), n(0)) ∈ I2(0,1). According to Theorem 3.2, H˙a = 0
on I2(0,1). Consequently if Ha(z(0), n(0)) = b then
Ha(z(t), n(t)) = Ha(z(0), n(0)) = b (15)
for any t ≥ 0 and (z(0), n(0)) ∈ I2(0,1). Since I2(0,1) is
positively invariant, Ωa,b is positively invariant. Finally, the
statement for L+a,b follows from [16, Lemma 4.1].
In the above lemma, the set of sets Ωa,b obtained by varying
a and b can be regarded as comprising two subsets. From
Lemma 3.4, Ha takes a unique maximum ca at (z¯a, 1/2), i.e.,
Ωa,ca = {(z¯a, 1/2)} = L+a,ca . This is the first subset. The
second is Ωa,b, b ̸= ca, and almost all Ωa,b are in this second
subset, for which we have the following.
Theorem 3.6: Each L+a,b, b ̸= ca in Lemma 3.5 is a periodic
orbit and Ωa,b = L+a,b.
Proof: Since L+a,b, b ̸= ca, does not contain any equi-
librium, the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem implies that this is
a periodic orbit. Next, we show Ωa,b = L+a,b. From index
theory [16, Corollary 2.1], any periodic orbit L+a,b, b ̸= ca con-
tains at least one equilibrium point in its interior In our case,
from Proposition 3.1, an equilibrium point uniquely exists and
is L+a,ca = {(z¯a, 1/2)}. From the proof of Lemma 3.4, Hz(z)
decreases as z increases above z¯a or decreases below z¯a. Also
Hn(n) decreases as n increases above 1/2 or decreases below
1/2. This means that if we pick an arbitrary point other than
(z¯a, 1/2), denoted by (z0, n0) and then move on the straight
line joining (z0, n0) to (z¯a, 1/2) in a direction away from
(z¯a, 1/2), both Hz and Hn must decrease, and consequently
Ha decreases. Hence, on any straight ray emanating from
(z¯a, 1/2), any value taken by Ha on the ray is taken at
only one point on the ray. Now suppose that there exists
(z0, n0) ̸= (z¯a, 1/2), which is in Ωa,b \L+a,b. Consider the ray
starting at (z¯a.1/2) and passing (z0, n0). There is a limiting
trajectory in L+a,b intersecting this ray, and the value of Ha at
the intersection point must be the same as that determined by
Ωa,b, i.e. the same as the value of Ha at the point (z0, n0).
By the uniqueness of the point on this ray with this value of
Ha, the point on L+a,b must be the same as (z0, n0). That is,
(z0, n0) ∈ L+a,b.
Corollary 3.7: A unique equilibrium point (z¯a, 1/2) of the
system Σa is neutrally stable.
Proof: First, the stability of (z¯a, 1/2) can be shown with
a Lyapunov function −H(z, n) + ca ≥ 0 on I2(0,1), where
−H(z, n) + ca = 0 if and only if (z, n) = (z¯a, 1/2). From
Theorem 3.6, (z¯a, 1/2) is not asymptotically stable and thus
it is neutrally stable.
Now, we go back to the original coordinates. Since ψ is a
globally real-analytic diffeomorphism from I3(0,1) to I
2
(0,1)×R,
Theorem 3.6 and Corollary 3.7 are applicable to conclude the
property in the original coordinates as follows. This is the
main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 3.8: The system Σ has the following properties.
1) Each equilibrium point in E is neutrally stable, where
E := {(xI , xII , n) ∈ I3(0,1) : n = 1/2,
(θI + λI)xI + (θII + λII)xII = λI + λII};
2) Each trajectory starting from I3(0,1) \ E is a periodic
orbit3.
IV. ON BOUNDARIES
In this section, we consider trajectories of the system in
the original coordinates on boundaries I3[0,1] \ I3(0,1) that are
six squares. When n = 0 or n = 1, the problem reduces
to a game between two different types of community. As
mentioned in Section III-A, mutual cooperation xI = xII = 0
(mutual defection xI = xII = 1) is a Nash equilibrium when
n = 1 (n = 0).
Therefore, we focus on the case xI = 0 or xI = 1
noting the cases xII = 0 are xII = 1 are essentially the
same. The motivation corresponds to a situation that one
community takes defection or cooperation irrespective of the
state of environment; this scenario cannot be studied when
one studies a single community. Actually, if community I is
always defective, i.e., its payoff matrix is AI,II(0), then x˙I < 0
for any (xI , xII , n) ∈ I3[0,1] such that xI ̸= 0 and xI ̸= 1.
3Note the distinction between having a one-parameter family of closed
orbits, as opposed to a single limit cycle.
Therefore, xI → 0 as t → ∞ for any (xI , xII , n) ∈ I3[0,1],
xI ̸= 1. The transient dynamics can be analyzed by studying
the case xI = 0.
By substituting xI = 0 into Σ, we have{
εx˙II = −σIIxII(1− xII)(1− 2n),
n˙ = −n(1− n) ((θII + λII)xII − (λI + λII))
This system has a constant of motion on I2(0,1).
HxI=0(xII , n) := (σII/ε)(ln(n) + ln(1− n))
+ (λI + λII) ln(xII) + (θII − λI) ln(1− xII).
If θII−λI > 0, then HxI=0 < 0 on I2(0,1), and HxI=0 → −∞
as (xII , n) tends to a corner in {0, 1}2. Also, there is a
heteroclinic cycle (0, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 1) → (1, 0) → (0, 0)
on the boundary I2[0,1] \I2(0,1), and at each corner, the Jacobian
matrix has one positive and one negative real eigenvalue. In a
similar manner with the previous section, one can conclude
that the interior I2(0,1) is positively invariant. Furthermore,
there is an infinite number of periodic orbits in I2(0,1).
If θII − λI < 0, there are heteroclinic orbits (1, 0) →
(0, 0)→ (0, 1)→ (1, 1) on the boundary I2[0,1] \ I2(0,1). At an
equilibrium (1, 0) ((1, 1)), the Jacobian matrix has two positive
real (two negative real) eigenvalues. At each equilibrium (0, 0)
and (0, 1), the Jacobian matrix has one positive and one
negative eigenvalue. Thus, any trajectory starting from the
interior I2(0,1) converges to (1, 1) or stays in the interior I
2
(0,1),
i.e. converges to a periodic orbit.
The case θII − λI = 0 is complicated, since the behaviour
of the system varies depending on the sign of θII − λI . In
this case, there are heteroclinic orbits (1, 0) → (0, 0) →
(0, 1)→ (1, 1) on the boundary I2[0,1] \I2(0,1). At the equilibria
(0, 0) or (0, 1), the Jacobian matrix has one positive and one
negative eigenvalue. Therefore, any trajectory starting from
the interior I2(0,1) does not converge to a line {0} × I[0,1]. On
the other hand, the line {1} × I[0,1] is a set of equilibria. A
constant energy function HxI=0(xII , n) is negative and finite
on this line {1} × I[0,1] and the interior I2(0,1), and it takes a
unique maximum at (1, 1/2). Except for the level set (point)
corresponding to (1, 1/2), each level set contains a pair of
points on the line, (1, n), n = n¯ < 1/2 and n = 1− n¯, where
in a similar manner of the previous section, one can show
that each level set is positively invariant. Next, at equilibrium
(1, n), the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are σII(1−2n)/ε
and 0, and the first eigenvalue is positive (zero or negative)
when n < 1/2 (n = 1/2 or n > 1/2). Therefore, the Poincare´-
Bendixson theorem implies that there exists an infinite number
of heteroclinic orbits starting from (1, n), n = n¯ < 1/2 and
approaching (1, n), n = 1− n¯. Moreover, (1, 1/2) is neutrally
stable.
In the case xI = 1, we have similar conclusions depending
on the sign of λII − θI . Especially when λII − θI is neg-
ative, community II and environment coexist. In summary,
depending on λi and θi, the behavior of replicator dynamics
varies when one community fixes its strategy irrespective of
the state of the environment. However, the other community
and environment still can coexist depending on ratios of λi and
θi, i.e. effects on the environment from the two communities.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied an evolutionary differential
game consisting of two different types of communities (both
evolving according to a prisoner’s dilemma game) and an
evolving environment. Our main result shows that the corre-
sponding replicator dynamics have an infinite number of peri-
odic orbits, i.e., none of the communities and environment dies
out if the communities are mutual cooperative (defective) when
environment is repleted (depleted), and if the environment is
defective (cooperative) when the communities are mutually
profligate (frugal).
This paper is the first step toward clarifying when multiple
communities and environments can coexist periodically. There
are a number of interesting future work such as studying higher
dimensional systems4 and different choices of payoff matri-
ces 5. Moreover, we have focused on proving the coexistence,
and to understand more detailed behavior of each community,
the game between two communities is needed to be studied.
We are currently working on these directions.
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